Insinuator


Some outright rants from a bunch of infosec practitioners.

TAG | IPv6

This is a guest post from Antonios Atlasis.

Yesterday we (Rafael Schaefer, Enno and me) had the pleasure to deliver together our talk at BlackHat Europe 2014 named Evasion of High-End IDPS Devices at the IPv6 Era (by the way, latest slides can be found here and the white paper here). In this talk we summarised all the IDPS evasion techniques that we have found so far. At previous blogposts I had the chance to describe how to evade Suricata and TippingPoint. In this post I am going to describe some other techniques that can be used to evade Snort, and its companion commercial version, Sourcefire. The tool used to evade these IDPS is –  what else – Chiron.

The versions that we used for our tests are the latest available ones at the time of this writing, that is:

  • Sourcefire, Model 3D7020 (63) Version 5.2.0.3 (Build 48), VDB version 216.
  • Snort 2.9.6.2 GRE (build 77), Registered User’s Release Rules.

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Oct/14

15

Deaggregation by large organizations

Some hours ago Iljitsch van Beijnum posted an email with the above subject to the RIPE Best Current Operational Practices (BCOP) mailing list.
Therein he describes the growing issue of (IPv6 prefix) deaggregation desires/approaches by certain organizations vs. the filtering practices of other organizations (providers). I touched this problem, from an enterprise’s perspective, some time ago in the second part of my blog post series on IPv6 address planning. Given we think that the discussion is heavily needed from several angles, I had actually submitted a talk on the topic twice (for the RIPE meeting in Warsaw in May and the upcoming one in London) which was unfortunately rejected at both occasions.
I’m hence very happy to see that a dialogue about the inherent dilemma might be started by Iljitsch’s mail. As a contribution to the development of a BCOP document I will hereby publish our draft slides of the talk which was initially planned. Furthermore two fellow IPv6 practitioners (Hi Roland & Nico!) and I plan to release a detailed paper with research results as for IPv6 prefix distribution at major European IXs in the near future.

Let’s hope that we as the IPv6 community can reach some consensus in this space soon. See you in London,
have a good one everybody

Enno

 

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Oct/14

14

North American IPv6 Summit 2014

Hello everyone,

I know I am a bit late with this post, but I was speaking on the North American IPv6 Summit in Denver three weeks ago. The focus of my talk was on Why IPv6 Security is hard – Structural Deficits of IPv6 & Their Implications (slightly modified/updated from the Troopers IPv6 Security Summit).  We consider the NA IPv6 Summit as one of the most important IPv6 events at all and we were happy to contribute to the overall success. The conference was organized for the 7th time by the Rocky Mountain IPv6 Task Force and took place in the Grand Hyatt Denver (37th floor ;-)). Luckily the weather was perfect, and the view of the landscape from the conference rooms was just amazing. I really enjoyed the time in Denver, as the organizer sdid all they could to treat the speaker well J. The talks were of mix of regular research or case-study type talks and some sponsored talks ranging from deployment experience, security and statistics to SDN (Yes, I said it ;)) and the Internet of Things (I said it again ;)). The line-up was nicely put together.

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This is a guest post from Antonios Atlasis.

Last week I had the pleasure to give you my impressions regarding my experience about hacking for b33r at Ghent, that is, my participation at BruCON 2014 hacking conference. As I said among else, the reason that I was there was to present Chiron, my IPv6 penetration testing/security assessment framework, which was supported by the Brucon 5×5 program. The first version of Chiron had been presented at Troopers 14, during the IPv6 Security Summit.

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Yesterday I gave a talk with the above title in a private setting. Given it might be of interest for some of you, the slides can be found here.

Have a great weekend everybody

Enno

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This is a guest post from Antonios Atlasis.

Today we had the opportunity at ERNW to have a full-day discussion about MLD. The discussion was led by Jayson Salazar who writes his thesis on the topic.

For the newcomers to IPv6 world, the purpose of MLD, a subprotocol of IPv6, as defined in RFC 2710, is “to enable each IPv6 router to discover the presence of multicast listeners (that is, nodes wishing to receive multicast packets) on its directly attached links, and to discover specifically which multicast addresses are of interest to those neighboring nodes.” MLD was updated by MLDv2 in RFC 3810 in order to “add the ability for a node to report interest in listening to packets with a particular multicast address only from specific source addresses or from all sources except for specific source addresses.

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This is a guest post by Antonios Atlasis.

Continuing the discussion about the IPv6 Atomic Fragments started at the IPv6 hacker’s mailing list and the freshly proposed draft RFC regarding the deprecation of the generation of IPv6 Atomic Fragments, we decided to check very quickly what is the current situation regarding the acceptance or the rejection of Atomic fragments in the “real world”. Thanks to Rafael Schaefer and the RISC lab at ERNW, we got some first measurements really fast.

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This is a guest post from Antonios Atlasis.

Taking the chance from a discussion on the IPv6 hacker’s mailing list and the freshly proposed draft RFC regarding the deprecation of the generation of IPv6 Atomic Fragments, I decided to test very quickly what is the current status related with the latest and some of the most poplar Operating Systems (OS) status (whether they send Atomic Fragments in response to Packet Too Big messages, or not). The motivation behind this was to check which one of them is potentially vulnerable to the DoS attack using the technique described in the above proposed RFC and taking it for granted that Atomic Fragments are blocked in the real world (but more about this, in another blogpost in the near future).

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Aug/14

12

ERNW @BlackHat US 2014

Last week we had the opportunity and pleasure to present some of our research results at BlackHat US 2014 (besides of meeting a lot of old friends and having a great researchers’ dinner).

Enno and Antonios gave their presentation on IDPS evasion by IPv6 Extension Headers, described here.

The material can be found here: Slides, tools (the main tool used was Chiron, authored by Antonios) & whitepaper.

Ayhan and me presented our results of the security analysis of Cisco’s EnergyWise protocol. The protocol enables network-wide power monitoring and control (ie turning servers off or on, putting phones to standby — basically controlling the power state of all EnergyWise-enabled or PoE devices). The main problem (besides a DoS vulnerability we found in IOS, see official Cisco advisory) is its PSK-based authentication model, which enables an attacker to cause large-scale blackouts in data centers if the deployment is lacking certain controls (for example our good old favorite, segmentation…). There will be a longer blogpost/newsletter on this topic soon.
The material can be found here: Slides & tools

Best,
Matthias

 

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This is a guest post from Antonios Atlasis.

In the “A Novel Way of Abusing IPv6 Extension Headers to Evade IPv6 Security Devices” blogpost I described a way to evade a high-end commercial IDPS device, the Tipping Point IDPS (TOS Tipping Point, Package 3.6.1.4036 and vaccine 3.2.0.8530 digital), by abusing a minor detail at the IPv6 specification. As I promised at the end of that blogpost, this is not the end. In this blogpost I am going to describe several new and different ways of evading another popular IDPS, an open-source one this time, Suricata.

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