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MLD Considered Harmful?

This is a guest post from Antonios Atlasis.

On Thursday the 20th Enno, Jayson and I had the pleasure to present our latest research results  regarding MLD at Deepsec 2014, both from vendors’ implementation perspective as well as regarding protocol design flaws (some preliminary results as well as our testing methodology were discussed here and here).

For refreshing out memory, in a nutshell, the purpose of MLD, a subprotocol of IPv6, is to inform routers about the presence of nodes which are interested in receiving specific multicast traffic (RFC 2710). The newer version of MLD, MLDv2 adds the ability for source address selection (RFC 3810).

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Protocol Properties & Attack Vectors

Next week, at DeepSec, we’re going to give a talk about Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD), a component of IPv6 which is realized by means of ICMPv6 messages. There are two versions of MLD (mainly specified in RFC 2710 and RFC 3810 respectively) and while MLD is technically implemented by ICMPv6 exchanges, these specifications describe a whole set of rules and communication formats, hence we can safely talk about “the MLD protocol”.

Now, you might ask: how does one tackle the task of examining the security “of a protocol”?

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