Admitted, we’re a bit late this time, but here we go with the agenda of this year’s TelcoSecDay.
Given the high number of quality contributions overall there’s more talks than in the previous years and we’ll hence start more early (and finish later ), so please plan accordingly.
This is the agenda, details for the invididual talks can be found in the respective links:
8:30-9:00 Opening & Intro
9:00-9:45 Luca Bruno: Through the Looking-Glass, and What Eve Found There
9:45-10:30 Dieter Spaar: How to Assess M2M Communication from an Attacker’s Perspective
11:00-11:45 Tobias Engel: Securing the SS7 Interconnect
11:45-12:30 Ravishankar Borgaonkar: TelcoSecurity Mirage: 1G to 5G
12:30-13:00 Hendrik Schmidt: Security Aspects of VoLTE
14:00-14:45 Rob Kuiters: On her majesty’s secret service – GRX and a Spy Agency
14:45-15:30 “Watching the Watchers”
16:00-16:45 Markus Vervier: Borrowing Mobile Network Identities – Just Because We Can
16:45-17:15 Shahar Tal: I hunt TR-069 admins – CWMP Insecurity
17:30-18:00 Sébastien Roche (Orange): tba
19:30 Dinner (it will be hosted by us, location & details will be provided during workshop and from @WEareTROOPERS).
See you all there, have a safe trip everybody
0 Comments | Posted by Enno Rey
We’ve just released a whitepaper discussing the behavior of different operating systems once they receive IPv6 configuration parameters from different sources. For that purpose a number of lab tests were conducted. (more…)
0 Comments | Posted by Christopher Werny
Troopers is right around the corner and as I am responsible for the whole conference network I wanted to make sure that everything is working as expected. I went to the venue on Friday because of two things I wanted/needed to setup. Compared to last year’s setup we had a couple of changes in regards to the provider connection (resulting in some changes for our network setup). First, we now have a rather big pipe for the uplink and more importantly (well that depends on the point of view ;)) there is a native IPv6 connection. Before that I had to tunnel all IPv6 traffic from the venue to one of our gateways and to forward it out (as native IPv6) from there. As this step isn’t necessary anymore, and the staff on the venue isn’t that experienced with IPv6, I had in mind to setup and verify that IPv6 is working as desired. The router used over there is a Mikrotek Routerboard. As I haven’t worked with these devices before, I was curious whether everything works as it should ;).
After configuring the IPv6 address on the WAN interface I tried to install a default route pointing to the uplink’s Global Unicast Address. But to my surprise, the Mikrotek router kept stating that the next hop was unreachable. This was odd, as the provider’s device was happily answering to pings from the Mikrotek’s command line. Additionally, the Mikrotek router does not install a route when it can’t reach the next hop configured (which is actually not that bad as it at least prevents fat fingering the address). It still didn’t make any sense. After googling around (I found the Mikrotek documentation a little bit lackluster) and trying some other things it still didn’t work. As a last resort, I told myself “screw it and let’s try with the link local address of the provider router”, but how do I get this address as I only was provided with the GUA? Right, looking at the Neighbor Cache of the Mikrotek router I was able to quickly find the link local address of the next hop.
After using this address (together with the interface) as the next hop it started working, by magic. At least I can now sleep better as it is one less thing I have to worry about ;).
Moral of the story: Still in 2015 don’t expect a device to behave like it should when it comes to IPv6. Unfortunately, I wasn’t able to follow this strange behavior up due to time constraints, but it is working and you can enjoy for the first time native IPv6 in the conference network.
If you want to know more about the general conference setup please stop by for my talk at the IPv6 Security Summit.
See you all in a week!
Based on recent research in the ERNW IPv6 lab and with our MLD talk looming we’ve put together a (as we think) comprehensive document discussing how to thoroughly test MLD implementations in various components (network devices or servers/clients). We hope it can contribute to a better understanding of the protocol and that it can serve as either a checklist for your own environment or as a source of inspiration for researchers looking at MLD themselves.
0 Comments | Posted by Enno Rey
This is a guest post from Antonios Atlasis.
Last year, during the IPv6 Security Summit of Troopers 14 I had the pleasure to present publicly, for first time, my IPv6 Penetration Testing / Security Assessment framework called Chiron, while later, it was also presented at Brucon 14 as part of the 5×5 project. This year, I am returning back to the place where it all started, to the beautiful city of Heidelberg to give another workshop about Chiron at the IPv6 Security Summit of Troopers 15. But, is it just another workshop with the known Chiron features or has something changed?
I would say a lot :). The most significant enhancements are described below.
This is a guest post from Vladimir Wolstencroft, to provide some details of his upcoming #TR15 talk.
What do you get when you combine a security appliance vendor, a bug bounty program, readily available virtualised machines, a lack of understanding of best security practices and broken crypto?
Ownage, a good story and maybe even that bounty…
0 Comments | Posted by Enno Rey
Today I gave a talk with said title in a private setting. Assuming the content might be of interest for some of you, we published the slides here.
As always we’re happy to receive comments or feedback.
Developing a secure and feature rich hypervisor is no easy task. Recently, the open source Xen hypervisor was affected by two interesting vulnerabilities involving its x86 emulation code: XSA 110 and XSA 105. Both bugs show that the attack surface of hypervisors is often larger than expected. XSA 105 was originally reported by Andrei Lutas from BitDefender. The patch adds missing privilege checks to the emulation routines of several critical system instructions including LGDT and LIDT. The vulnerable code can be reached from unprivileged user code running inside hardware virtual machine (HVM) guests and can be used to escalate guest privileges. XSA 110 was reported by Jan Beulich from SUSE and concerns insufficient checks when emulating long jumps, calls or returns.