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	<title>Comments for Insinuator</title>
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	<link>http://www.insinuator.net</link>
	<description>Some outright rants from a bunch of infosec practitioners.</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Tue, 04 Jun 2013 09:07:57 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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	<item>
		<title>Comment on VMDK Has Left the Building &#8212; Some Nasty Attacks Against VMware vSphere 5 Based Cloud Infrastructures by Johnny</title>
		<link>http://www.insinuator.net/2012/05/vmdk-has-left-the-building/comment-page-1/#comment-3415</link>
		<dc:creator>Johnny</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 04 Jun 2013 09:07:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.insinuator.net/?p=1193#comment-3415</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Hi Guys,

Well done for soime really interesting work. I am fairly new to this and would like to know if there are some detailed instructions for this exploit, i.e. I have a test enviornment on a Netapp san and the local hard disk storage. WOuld like to create a VM and break out of the VM to the Host. How do I configure the RAW disk settings?



Thanks a lot for the excellent and thought proving write up.


John]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi Guys,</p>
<p>Well done for soime really interesting work. I am fairly new to this and would like to know if there are some detailed instructions for this exploit, i.e. I have a test enviornment on a Netapp san and the local hard disk storage. WOuld like to create a VM and break out of the VM to the Host. How do I configure the RAW disk settings?</p>
<p>Thanks a lot for the excellent and thought proving write up.</p>
<p>John</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on IPv6 Neighbor Cache Exhaustion Attacks &#8211; Risk Assessment &amp; Mitigation Strategies, Part 1 by Antonios Atlasis</title>
		<link>http://www.insinuator.net/2013/03/ipv6-neighbor-cache-exhaustion-attacks-risk-assessment-mitigation-strategies-part-1/comment-page-1/#comment-3354</link>
		<dc:creator>Antonios Atlasis</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 01 Jun 2013 06:32:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.insinuator.net/?p=1993#comment-3354</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Great article Enno. Thanks for sharing your test results. Your explanation seems very reasonable to me. 
I believe that in order this attack to be effective, the &quot;malicious&quot; packets should arrive even faster from several distributed sources at the same time (aka DDoS), which, of course, it doesn&#039;t make it that trivial attack. Nevertheless, this would be a rather typical DDoS flooding attack which could take down the target for other reasons too.
Unless, as you said, we miss something...]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Great article Enno. Thanks for sharing your test results. Your explanation seems very reasonable to me.<br />
I believe that in order this attack to be effective, the &#8220;malicious&#8221; packets should arrive even faster from several distributed sources at the same time (aka DDoS), which, of course, it doesn&#8217;t make it that trivial attack. Nevertheless, this would be a rather typical DDoS flooding attack which could take down the target for other reasons too.<br />
Unless, as you said, we miss something&#8230;</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on RA Guard Support by LT</title>
		<link>http://www.insinuator.net/2013/05/ra-guard-support/comment-page-1/#comment-2834</link>
		<dc:creator>LT</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 07 May 2013 10:00:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.insinuator.net/?p=2150#comment-2834</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The HP list doesn&#039;t look particularly accurate. The 2910 definitely does RA guard - you can confirm in these release notes:

http://h20000.www2.hp.com/bc/docs/support/SupportManual/c03467132/c03467132.pdf

I&#039;m relatively sure the 2920 does too.

It would be worth adding extreme networks devices to the list too.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The HP list doesn&#8217;t look particularly accurate. The 2910 definitely does RA guard &#8211; you can confirm in these release notes:</p>
<p><a href="http://h20000.www2.hp.com/bc/docs/support/SupportManual/c03467132/c03467132.pdf" rel="nofollow">http://h20000.www2.hp.com/bc/docs/support/SupportManual/c03467132/c03467132.pdf</a></p>
<p>I&#8217;m relatively sure the 2920 does too.</p>
<p>It would be worth adding extreme networks devices to the list too.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on RA Guard Support by Wolfgang Neudorfer</title>
		<link>http://www.insinuator.net/2013/05/ra-guard-support/comment-page-1/#comment-2831</link>
		<dc:creator>Wolfgang Neudorfer</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 07 May 2013 07:17:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.insinuator.net/?p=2150#comment-2831</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Thanks for the list Enno!

Regards, W.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks for the list Enno!</p>
<p>Regards, W.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on RA Guard Support by Sander Steffann</title>
		<link>http://www.insinuator.net/2013/05/ra-guard-support/comment-page-1/#comment-2747</link>
		<dc:creator>Sander Steffann</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 May 2013 20:32:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.insinuator.net/?p=2150#comment-2747</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[If someone is doing further research on this topic it would be interesting to see which switches can detect and/or drop fragmented Router Advertisements. That is currently a common way of evade RA Guard.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If someone is doing further research on this topic it would be interesting to see which switches can detect and/or drop fragmented Router Advertisements. That is currently a common way of evade RA Guard.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on BPDU Guard: Bringing Down Infrastructures by alpacapowered</title>
		<link>http://www.insinuator.net/2013/04/bpdu-guard-bringing-down-infrastructures/comment-page-1/#comment-2636</link>
		<dc:creator>alpacapowered</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 25 Apr 2013 14:14:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.insinuator.net/?p=2036#comment-2636</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[One thing to note: The ESXi vSwitch BDPU filter feature is not only available since 5.1, but has also been implemented on ESXi 5.0 and even 4.1 with these patches last year:
http://kb.vmware.com/kb/2032597
http://kb.vmware.com/kb/2020743

You are not required to update to 5.1 to make use of the BDPU filter.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>One thing to note: The ESXi vSwitch BDPU filter feature is not only available since 5.1, but has also been implemented on ESXi 5.0 and even 4.1 with these patches last year:<br />
<a href="http://kb.vmware.com/kb/2032597" rel="nofollow">http://kb.vmware.com/kb/2032597</a><br />
<a href="http://kb.vmware.com/kb/2020743" rel="nofollow">http://kb.vmware.com/kb/2020743</a></p>
<p>You are not required to update to 5.1 to make use of the BDPU filter.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on Some more Notes on RA Guard Evasion and &#8220;undetermined-transport&#8221; by erey</title>
		<link>http://www.insinuator.net/2013/04/some-more-notes-on-ra-guard-evasion-and-undetermined-transport/comment-page-1/#comment-2459</link>
		<dc:creator>erey</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Apr 2013 10:28:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.insinuator.net/?p=2096#comment-2459</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Hi Alex,

thanks for your feedback.
Here&#039;s the &quot;sh ver&quot;:

Switch&gt;sh ver &#124; b Ports
Switch Ports Model              SW Version            SW Image
------ ----- -----              ----------            ----------
*    1 10    WS-C3560CG-8PC-S   15.0(2)SE             C3560c405ex-UNIVERSALK9-M

This one was/isn&#039;t stacked with anything.

best

Enno]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi Alex,</p>
<p>thanks for your feedback.<br />
Here&#8217;s the &#8220;sh ver&#8221;:</p>
<p>Switch>sh ver | b Ports<br />
Switch Ports Model              SW Version            SW Image<br />
&#8212;&#8212; &#8212;&#8211; &#8212;&#8211;              &#8212;&#8212;&#8212;-            &#8212;&#8212;&#8212;-<br />
*    1 10    WS-C3560CG-8PC-S   15.0(2)SE             C3560c405ex-UNIVERSALK9-M</p>
<p>This one was/isn&#8217;t stacked with anything.</p>
<p>best</p>
<p>Enno</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on Some more Notes on RA Guard Evasion and &#8220;undetermined-transport&#8221; by Alex</title>
		<link>http://www.insinuator.net/2013/04/some-more-notes-on-ra-guard-evasion-and-undetermined-transport/comment-page-1/#comment-2458</link>
		<dc:creator>Alex</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Apr 2013 10:15:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.insinuator.net/?p=2096#comment-2458</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Hi Enno,

The expected behaviour should be the following on 15.0(2)SE: &quot;undetermined-transport&quot; should be supported on 3560s, but only on X and E series. The non X and E series do not support the &quot;undetermined-transport&quot; keyword, but should accept the ACL blindly (in case they are stacked with X and E).
The non X and E series might never support &quot;undetermined-transport&quot; for hardware reasons.

The output you provide seems to be different, and would indicate that the parser requires a specific order to apply the ACL. This is not good and we should get a bug filed if you are running an X/E series. If not, I&#039;ll get pushed back by engineering.

I don&#039;t have a 3560 X or E available, so would you mind providing a &quot;sh ver&quot; from your switch so I can file a bug internally for this?

Cheers,
Alex]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi Enno,</p>
<p>The expected behaviour should be the following on 15.0(2)SE: &#8220;undetermined-transport&#8221; should be supported on 3560s, but only on X and E series. The non X and E series do not support the &#8220;undetermined-transport&#8221; keyword, but should accept the ACL blindly (in case they are stacked with X and E).<br />
The non X and E series might never support &#8220;undetermined-transport&#8221; for hardware reasons.</p>
<p>The output you provide seems to be different, and would indicate that the parser requires a specific order to apply the ACL. This is not good and we should get a bug filed if you are running an X/E series. If not, I&#8217;ll get pushed back by engineering.</p>
<p>I don&#8217;t have a 3560 X or E available, so would you mind providing a &#8220;sh ver&#8221; from your switch so I can file a bug internally for this?</p>
<p>Cheers,<br />
Alex</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on IPv6 Neighbor Cache Exhaustion Attacks &#8211; Risk Assessment &amp; Mitigation Strategies, Part 1 by Eric Vyncke</title>
		<link>http://www.insinuator.net/2013/03/ipv6-neighbor-cache-exhaustion-attacks-risk-assessment-mitigation-strategies-part-1/comment-page-1/#comment-2408</link>
		<dc:creator>Eric Vyncke</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 12 Apr 2013 13:46:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.insinuator.net/?p=1993#comment-2408</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Actually, what I meant to say is that &#039;destination guard&#039; is the silver bullet to mitigate this attack (i.e. router never initiates a NS for unknown IPv6 address, it only refreshes existing ones), but, usually, the normal thresholds are OK for most deployments.

Thanks for the testing BTW

-éric]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Actually, what I meant to say is that &#8216;destination guard&#8217; is the silver bullet to mitigate this attack (i.e. router never initiates a NS for unknown IPv6 address, it only refreshes existing ones), but, usually, the normal thresholds are OK for most deployments.</p>
<p>Thanks for the testing BTW</p>
<p>-éric</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on Loki for Windows released by Mr. Derp</title>
		<link>http://www.insinuator.net/2012/11/loki-for-windows-released/comment-page-1/#comment-2390</link>
		<dc:creator>Mr. Derp</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 12 Apr 2013 03:11:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.insinuator.net/?p=1688#comment-2390</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Thanks for releasing the tool. It&#039;s awesome!

Mr. Derp]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks for releasing the tool. It&#8217;s awesome!</p>
<p>Mr. Derp</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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